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This paper reviews evidence on the neural basis of how positive mood states can
modulate cognition, particularly during creative problem-solving. Studies performed over
the past few decades demonstrate that individuals in a positive mood engage in a
broader scope of attention, enhancing their access to distant and unusual semantic
associations, and increasing task-shifting and problem-solving capacities. In this review,
we summarize these behavioral studies; we then present recent findings on the changes
in brain activation patterns that are induced by a positive mood when participants engage
in problem-solving tasks and show how these relate to task performance. Additionally,
we integrate findings on the neuromodulatory influence of positive mood on cognition
as mediated by dopaminergic signaling in the prefrontal cortex and we describe how
this system can go awry during pathological states of elevated mood as in mania.
Finally, we describe current and future research directions using psychotherapeutic and
real-time fMRI neurofeedback approaches to up-regulate positive mood and facilitate
optimal creative cognitive performance. We conclude with some speculations on the
clinical implications of this emerging area of research.
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INTRODUCTION
Positive mood states—states of happiness—are the mental or
emotional states of well-being characterized by positive emo-
tions ranging from quiet contentment to intense joy (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness). When Abraham Lincoln said,
“People are just as happy as they make up their minds to be,” he
was suggesting that happiness is a state of mind which to a certain
extent is under our control. This is an important point since hap-
piness is arguably the single most important factor for enhanc-
ing life satisfaction and success (Fredrickson, 2000). Happiness
has been shown to be both the cause and consequence of suc-
cess across various life domains including marriage, friendship,
work performance, and overall health (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005;
Sin and Lyubomirsky, 2009). For example, happiness is asso-
ciated with better social interactions and higher work incomes
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2005); better coping abilities (Moskowitz,
2010); health-related benefits (Moskowitz et al., 2008); self-beliefs
of enhanced health, intelligence and social interactions (Myers
and Diener, 1995); and greater personal resilience and overall
well-being (Fredrickson, 2000, 2004). People in happy, positive
mood states are better able to modulate cognition by enhancing
broader thought-action repertoires, and demonstrate broadened
attention, greater cognitive flexibility, and heightened creativity
(Isen et al., 1985, 1987, 1991; Estrada et al., 1994; Fredrickson,
2004; Isen, 2005). Taken together, within the past three decades,
studies from the positive psychology literature have revealed
a plethora of behavioral evidence demonstrating that positive
mood states contribute to life satisfaction and enhance certain
aspects of cognitive performance.
Although the behavioral evidence of the interactions between
positive mood and cognition is well-documented, there are very
few studies that demonstrate how a positive mood can influ-
ence cognition at the neural systems level (e.g., Subramaniam
et al., 2009). A deeper understanding of these neurobiological
processes is critical, not just for understanding these mechanisms
in healthy individuals, but for broadening our approach to the
development of treatments for individuals with psychiatric ill-
nesses that are often characterized by deficits in positive mood
and cognition, such as people suffering from depressive disorders
and schizophrenia.
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT POSITIVE
MOOD MODULATES COGNITIVE OPERATIONS
Positive mood states facilitate a broad scope of attention (Gasper
and Clore, 2002; Bolte et al., 2003) and enhance more integra-
tive access to distant semantic associations (Isen et al., 1985;
Federmeier et al., 2001; Friedman et al., 2003). This broader and
more holistic mode of attention predicts and promotes cognitive
control/flexibility, including flexible coping skills (Koestler, 1964;
Aspinwall and Taylor, 1997) and creative solutions to problem-
solving tasks (Isen et al., 1987; Rowe et al., 2007). Cognitive
control is a multifaceted set of operations that includes the ability
to inhibit dominant yet incorrect problem-solving paths and to
switch between problem-solving strategies, and/or between broad
and focused modes of attention. The result of increased cogni-
tive control is that solvers are better able to select and act upon
non-dominant yet correct solutions. A positive mood enhances
these cognitive control processes by facilitating switching between
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broad and focused attentional modes (Baumann and Kuhl, 2005),
and between different solving strategies (Dreisbach and Goschke,
2004), so that solvers are better able to reduce perseveration
tendencies on errant problem-solving paths and increase selec-
tion of the correct solution (Ashby et al., 1999, 2002). Although
the different studies described below induced positive mood
in participants through various techniques, they all conducted
objective mood manipulation measures to ensure that the tar-
get mood was induced and maintained. Together, the find-
ings suggest that regardless of the mood induction method,
a positive mood reliably enhances cognitive processes in dis-
tinct ways. We discuss each of these processes in more detail
below.
POSITIVE MOOD FACILITATES A BROADENING SCOPE OF ATTENTION
Prior research suggests that a positive mood broadens the scope of
attention, thoughts and actions (Fredrickson, 2001; Gasper and
Clore, 2002; Bolte et al., 2003; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005);
this involves attending to more stimuli in both external visual
space and internal semantic space, allowing access to more infor-
mation to simultaneously influence solution efforts (Rowe et al.,
2007). Furthermore, positive mood states are associated with
greater global or holistic processing (i.e., seeing the forest before
the trees) vs. local processing (i.e., seeing the trees before the
forest). For example, Gasper and Clore (2002) induced positive
and negative mood states by asking healthy participants to recall
personal life events that made them feel either positive or nega-
tive. The mood manipulation check was effective; participants felt
more positive and less negative after writing about a happy event.
Subsequently, they measured mood-attention relationships with
a visual matching test (see Figure 1, adapted from Kimchi and
Palmer, 1982) in which participants were instructed to indicate
which one of two sample figures looks most like a target figure.
Each figure was either a square or a triangle (global feature) made
up of smaller squares or triangles (local feature). Results revealed
that positive mood participants were more likely to match the
objects on the basis of global features than participants in a neg-
ative mood (Gasper and Clore, 2002). In a subsequent study,
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) replicated similar findings to
FIGURE 1 | Global-local task. One item from the global-local shape task
[adapted with permission from Kimchi and Palmer (1982)]. Participants had
to indicate which one of two sample figures most resembled the target
figure (i.e., square made of squares). Each figure was either a square or a
triangle (global feature) made up of smaller squares or triangles (local
feature).
the Gasper and Clore (2002), using an alternative mood induction
technique of positive, neutral and negative film clips to induce
the target mood state in healthy participants. When compar-
ing participants’ mood ratings to the film clips, Fredrickson and
Branigan (2005) found that each film clip was effective at induc-
ing the target mood state. They also found that after participants
watched the positive films, they showed a significantly larger
global bias on the global-local visual task when compared to the
neutral mood participants, confirming their hypothesis that a
positive mood broadens attention.
POSITIVE MOOD FACILITATES INTEGRATION AND ACCESS TO DISTANT
SEMANTIC ASSOCIATIONS ACROSS A DIVERSE RANGE OF TASKS
Positive mood can also enhance integration processes, facilitating
a broader access to remote semantic associations (Isen et al., 1987;
Estrada et al., 1997; Federmeier et al., 2001; Bolte et al., 2003),
which, in turn, facilitates creative problem solving. Some exam-
ples of how a positive mood enhances integration processes arise
from word association tasks. Isen et al. (1985) used several dif-
ferent mood induction methods to induce the target mood state
in participants: in one experiment, they used affectively-valenced
(positive, neutral, and negative) words; in another experiment,
they used positive and neutral film clips; and in a third experi-
ment they gave participants candy vs. nomanipulation. After each
of these mood induction methods, participants performed word-
association tasks in which they were presented with a neutral
word and were then required to respond with word associations
that came tomind (Isen et al., 1985; Ashby et al., 1999). Regardless
of the mood induction method, Isen et al. (1985) found that par-
ticipants in a positive mood were more likely to respond with
remote word associations compared to participants in a neutral
mood. For example, the dominant interpretation of the word
pen is a writing tool; neutral-mood participants were likely to
respond with a high frequency associate, such as pencil or paper.
However, participants in a positive mood also included remote
interpretations of pen as a fenced enclosure, and were thus more
likely to respond with associations such as barn or pig. Thus, in
Ashby et al.’s (1999) connectionist model of cognitive set selec-
tion, a positive mood led to the selection of a broader set of
remote associations, which is known to promote creative solving
ability.
These beneficial effects of a positive mood on enhancing inte-
gration processes across a broad set of semantic associations has
been demonstrated many times, using a diverse range of tasks
and populations—from college students doing word association
and creative problem-solving tasks, to industrialists engaging in
negotiations, to doctors integrating non-dominant yet relevant
information earlier while solving medical cases (Carnevale and
Isen, 1986; Isen et al., 1987; Estrada et al., 1994, 1997; Rowe et al.,
2007). For example, when a positive mood was induced in doc-
tors by giving them candy, they integrated non-dominant remote
information earlier when solving a rare case of chronic hepatitis,
as compared to controls in a neutral mood (Estrada et al., 1997).
This positive mood-induced access to a broader range of asso-
ciations and thoughts appears to facilitate cognitive control and
creative problem-solving across a range of tasks (Isen et al., 1987;
Baumann and Kuhl, 2002; Bolte et al., 2003; Fredrickson, 2004).
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POSITIVE MOOD FACILITATES COGNITIVE CONTROL PROCESSES
INVOLVED IN TASK SWITCHING AND RESPONSE SELECTION
In addition to broadening attention and promoting access to dis-
tant semantic associations, positive mood also facilitates creative
problem solving by facilitating task switching and response selec-
tion. The remote association task (RAT) was created by Mednick
(1962) to investigate specific aspects of cognitive control and
creative problem solving. The RAT consists of presenting three
seemingly unrelated words that are associated with a third solu-
tion word in different ways. For instance, the words: TENNIS,
STICK and SAME are associated with the solution word MATCH
by formation of a compound word (matchstick), by semantic
association (tennis match), and by synonymy (same = match).
The RAT task requires both broad divergent thinking and more
focused convergent thinking. During broad divergent thinking,
solvers need to access a wide set of associations (i.e., association
words for TENNIS include: GAME, RACKET, BALL, COURT,
SET, PLAYER, MATCH). During focused convergent thinking,
solvers need to integrate distant semantic associations in differ-
ent ways to find the correct meaningful solution (i.e., of all the
associations, only MATCH fits with the words: TENNIS, STICK
and SAME). Several groups have shown that on Mednick’s cre-
ative RAT, participants in a positive mood state produced more
solutions compared to controls in a neutral or negative mood,
both in a sample of college students as well as in practicing
physicians (Isen et al., 1987; Estrada et al., 1994; Rowe et al.,
2007).
WemodifiedMednick’s (1962) RAT task into a simpler version
called the Compound Remote Association (CRA) task in which
the solution word has to form a compound word or phrase with
each of the three target words (Subramaniam et al., 2009). In the
CRA task, the solver is given 3 words such as “tooth,” “potato,”
and “heart” and is asked to think of a fourth word that can be
combined with all three to form a compound word or phrase.
The solution word can be placed either before or after any of the
three words in the triad to form the compound word. In this
case, “sweet” is the solution word, which forms the compounds
“sweet-tooth” “sweet-potato,” and “sweetheart.” In the CRA task,
when participants see the word “tooth” they need to inhibit the
dominant association “ache” or “pain” when they realize that pain
does not fit with potato (i.e., “potato-pain?”), and must switch to
select an alternative non-dominant solution (i.e., “sweet” form-
ing sweet-tooth, sweet-potato, and sweetheart). These problems
are typically associated with insightful solutions, in which par-
ticipants have an “Aha!” or “Eureka” experience during solution
success.
Insightful problem solving requires engagement of cognitive
control mechanisms involved in task switching and alternate
response selection because there is frequently an impasse where
solvers feel stuck, and believe they are making no progress
toward the solution. To overcome this impasse, solvers need to
inhibit prepotent albeit irrelevant associations in order to allow
access and integration of remote yet solution-relevant concepts.
Solvers are then able to suddenly recognize connections that
had previously eluded them, and instantly see the solution in
a new light in the “Eureka!” experience. Therefore, insightful
problem-solving requires inhibition of task-irrelevant but
prepotent responses, as well as task-switching to broader but
non-dominant solution-relevant associations (Subramaniam
et al., 2009).
We found that healthy college students higher in assessed pos-
itive mood (assessed with the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale
immediately prior to the experiment) solved more CRA prob-
lems overall, and specifically solved more CRA problems with
insight, compared to college students lower in assessed positive
mood. We also found that a positive mood was associated with
increased brain activity in the medial prefrontal region during a
preparatory interval preceding each solved problem. A positive
mood was correlated with stronger preparatory signal that led to
insight vs. analytical solutions, thus biasing participants toward
insightful problem-solving; it appears that increased mPFC activ-
ity was associated with greater prefrontal cognitive control, which
in turn allowed solvers to switch between broad attentional modes
(required for detection of distant remote solution candidates) and
focused attention for response selection (required to converge
upon the correct solution).
Consistent with this interpretation, Baumann and Kuhl (2005)
demonstrated that participants in a positive mood showed greater
cognitive control in a global-local shape detection task (see
Figure 2). In Figure 2, for the item on the left, the target “cir-
cle” is presented on a local dimension, but is presented on a
global dimension for the item on the right. In order to induce
the target mood state, participants were asked to recall per-
sonal experiences that felt positive or negative, and were then
asked to note down positive, neutral, and negative words which
reminded them of their past experiences. Participants were then
given a self-generated prime-word (i.e., either positive, neutral
or negative), which was then followed by the global-local shape
task. When participants were in a positive vs. a neutral or nega-
tive mood, they responded faster to targets presented on a local
dimension when the task necessitated local-feature detection. As
such, they showed increased cognitive control by overcoming a
global precedence in order to respond to non-dominant local fea-
tures (i.e., detecting the circles that make up the triangle). In
contrast, participants in a negative mood had slower response
FIGURE 2 | Global-local task of cognitive control. For the item on the
left, the circle is the target, presented on a local dimension. For the item on
the right, the target circle is presented on a global dimension [reproduced
with permission from Baumann and Kuhl (2005)]. Participants in a positive
mood demonstrated increased cognitive control by responding to
non-dominant local features (i.e., detecting the target circles that made up
the triangle).
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times to local targets when compared to a neutral mood. These
results suggest that participants in a negative mood state had less
cognitive flexibility, and thus were slower in switching to a non-
prepotent local mode of processing from the default global mode
of processing.
Switching can occur between global and local modes of atten-
tion, and also between strategies (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004;
Baumann and Kuhl, 2005). Prior research has shown that a pos-
itive mood enhances switching between different perspectives
(Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen, 2005). A shift from a focused
local to a global attentional state increases the scope of seman-
tic and visual access, which can promote enhanced selection of
solution-relevant responses on classic insight problems such as
Duncker’s candle task (Duncker and Lees, 1945). Participants
watched either a comedy film clip or a neutral film clip to induce
the target mood state, followed by a word-rating scale to verify the
efficacy of the mood manipulation. Following the manipulation
check, participants were asked to solve Duncker’s candle task. In
this task, participants were presented with a box of tacks, a candle,
and a book of matches and were asked to attach the candle to the
wall in a way that it will burnwithout dripping wax on the table or
floor. Participants in a positive vs. neutral mood were better able
to shift their perspective from viewing the box as a container to
viewing the box as a platform for the candle. Switching away from
the prepotent view of perceiving the box as a container to view-
ing it as a platform facilitated solving when participants realized
that the upright candle could be tacked from the matchbox to the
wall (Isen et al., 1987). More recently, a positive mood has been
shown to reduce perseveration and facilitate switching/shielding
from distracters (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004). It is important
to note, however, that an optimal balance between task switch-
ing and task-shielding operations must be maintained in order to
maximize creative problem-solving. A field of attention that is too
broad, with far-ranging associations and a high degree of switch-
ing between solving strategies, can lead to increased distractibility,
inhibiting solution selection. Similarly, a solver who maintains a
very focused and narrow spotlight of attention, with little ability
to switch away from unsuccessful strategies, will become “stuck”
in a fruitless search for the solution.
MEDIAL PREFRONTAL NEURAL ACTIVATION IS A KEY
COMPONENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVE MOOD ON
COGNITIVE PROCESSING
While a significant amount of research has been conducted on the
neurobiology of reward (e.g., Beninger, 1991; Phillips et al., 1992;
Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Cooper et al., 2009) and on the neu-
ral correlates of positive mood (e.g., Lane et al., 1998; Damasio
et al., 2000; Habel et al., 2005; Burgdorf and Panksepp, 2006), only
few studies have examined the neural system activation patterns
mediating positive mood and cognition (Federmeier et al., 2001;
Subramaniam et al., 2009, 2013).
Federmeier et al. (2001) used ERP to investigate the influence
of positive mood on semantic relatedness. Mood was manip-
ulated in each participant using positive and neutral photos
from the International Affective Picture System. The effective-
ness of the mood state induction was assessed with a written
questionnaire asking participants to report on how much they
liked the photos from each condition. Federmeier et al. (2001)
found that a positive mood facilitated meaningful processing of
distantly-related information, thus broadening semantic access
and integration. Specifically, these investigators examined the
N400 response, as an index of semantic relatedness on a sen-
tence completion task. Participants read sentence pairs ending
with either: (1) the most expected word, (2) an unexpected word
from an expected semantic category, or (3) an unexpected word
from a different (related) category. An example of a sentence
was: “They wanted to make the hotel look more like a trop-
ical resort. So, they planted rows of . . . ” For the final word,
(1) the most expected item, would be “palms”; (2) an unex-
pected item from the same semantic category would be “pines”;
(3) and an unexpected item from a different semantic category
would be “tulips.” Following a positive mood induction vs. a
neutral mood induction, participants showed a reduced N400
amplitude (indexing meaningful processing) for unexpected dif-
ferent category exemplars. Thus, a positive mood compared to
a neutral mood specifically facilitated meaningful processing of
distantly-related between-category exemplars. Subsequent stud-
ies have replicated the impact of positive mood on broadening the
scope of semantic access (Rowe et al., 2007; Subramaniam et al.,
2009). This suggests that a positive mood may facilitate integra-
tion processes by relaxing constraints to enhance both semantic
distance as well as breadth of attention.
In an fMRI study using Compound Remote Associate (CRA)
problems (Subramaniam et al., 2009), we found that partici-
pants who were higher in a positive mood state (assessed with
the PANAS, immediately prior to the fMRI study) revealed
greater ACC/mPFC activity during a preparation period prior to
problem onset when compared to participants lower in a pos-
itive mood (see Figure 3). Increased mPFC activation prior to
problem onset appears to represent an enhanced state of cre-
ative cognitive preparation, as it correlated with participants’
overall solving ability, with insight solving and with positive
mood. These data suggest that mPFC preparatory signal predis-
posed positive mood participants to solve more problems overall,
and to specifically solve more of the problems using insight
(Subramaniam et al., 2009). We also demonstrated, using EEG
topography and frequency recordings that insight preparation
FIGURE 3 | Positive mood preparatory effect. Signal change in
mPFC/ACC and posterior cingulate cortex during the preparation period for
participants high in positive mood vs. participants low in positive mood, at a
threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected). Increased mPFC signal enhanced
cognitive preparation, predisposing positive mood participants to solve
more problems overall, and to specifically solve more creatively with insight
[adapted from Subramaniam et al. (2009)].
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(i.e., preparatory brain states that bias and facilitate subsequent
solving with insight), compared to step-by-step analytical prepa-
ration, involved increased activity over medial prefrontal regions
(Kounios et al., 2006). Increased activation over medial prefrontal
regions appeared to reflect increased preparation to exert top-
down cognitive control mechanisms to switch cognitive strategies
and select the correct solution. Additionally, insight compared to
step-by-step analytical preparation also involved occipital alpha
activation (which inversely relates to neural activity) thought
to shield top-down processes from interference by bottom up
visual stimulation (Kounios et al., 2006). Thus, a positive mood
may predispose and facilitate creative cognition by enhancing
activation within the medial prefrontal cortex, thus support-
ing the regulation of attention/cognitive control processes as
the demands of the task necessitate. Creative insightful solu-
tions may be facilitated by modulating the shift between task
shielding effects (i.e., shown by visual occipital alpha activa-
tion during insight preparation) and task switching/selection
effects (i.e., shown by increased activity over medial frontal
regions). Enhanced cognitive control induced by a positive mood
enables solvers to switch away from task-irrelevant distracters
in order to select from a broader array of solution-relevant
information.
In a subsequent fMRI study, we demonstrated that not only
a positive mood, but also positive stimuli could enhance neu-
ral patterns associated with creative cognition (Subramaniam
et al., 2013). We specifically examined how positive stimuli
(i.e., positive words) could modulate creative metaphoric pro-
cessing. A metaphor is a figure of speech in which a sub-
ject is compared to an unrelated object (i.e., He is the apple
of my eye). Metaphoric comprehension is considered a type
of creative cognition, and involves linking previously unasso-
ciated meanings in order to create a new understanding of
one item in terms of another (in the example above, the
“apple” refers to someone beloved). According to the Gradient
Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003), metaphoric processing
is modulated by the conventionality, frequency, and familiar-
ity of the words. We investigated neural processes associated
with conventional (familiar) metaphors (e.g., brain freeze) as
well as novel (unfamiliar) metaphors (e.g., unfenced idea).
Conventional metaphoric processing involves recalling a familiar
closely-connected meaning (Amanzio et al., 2008). By contrast,
novel metaphoric processing is a type of creative cognition that
involves formulating new meanings from unfamiliar expressions
that have not been previously encountered (Subramaniam et al.,
2012a).
In our metaphor study (Subramaniam et al., 2013), prior
to fMRI scanning, participants received a list of word pairs
(novel unfamiliar metaphors, conventional familiar metaphors,
and unrelated meaningless words) and were asked to denote
the valence (positive, negative, or neutral) of each word pair.
For example, conventional familiar metaphors such as “beau-
tiful mind,” “visual field,” and “sour grapes” were typically
classified as having positive, neutral and negative connota-
tions, respectively. Similarly, novel unfamiliar metaphors such
as “joy bits,” “memory phantoms” and “caged cry” were also
typically classified as having positive, neutral, and negative
connotations. During fMRI scanning, participants had to decide
whether the word pairs formed meaningful or meaningless
expressions.
We found that participants made more accurate meaningful
judgments when viewing metaphors that were positively-
valenced, and that this was associated with enhanced modulation
of the mPFC. The mPFC was activated during positively-
valenced metaphors in general, but revealed most activation
specifically when participants viewed positively-valenced novel
metaphors (see Figure 4). We hypothesize that increased mPFC
signal for positively-valenced novel metaphors (which may also
have induced a positive mood reaction) enabled participants
to have a broader scope of attention that facilitated access to
a broad array of different possible semantic interpretations for
the unfamiliar word pairs. Greater mPFC modulation may also
have enabled participants to exert greater cognitive control to
eliminate, or switch away, from meaningless interpretations.
In this way, participants were better able to select the cor-
rect interpretation that linked the novel words together in a
meaningful way.
We do not mean to imply that the observed activations
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) represents a neu-
ral correlate of positive mood, nor that positive mood states
will always benefit cognition. We also do not mean to sug-
gest that the mPFC is the only brain region which medi-
ates positive mood-cognition interactions. Indeed, other regions
such as the basal ganglia—that are central to both cognition
(McNab and Klingberg, 2008) and reward processes (Knutson
and Cooper, 2005)—are also important in mood-cognition inter-
actions. However, our data do indicate that positive mood
enhances activity in the rostral dACC/mPFC, and that increased
activation in this region (even prior to the onset of a problem) is
FIGURE 4 | Positive creative novel metaphoric effect. Signal change for
positively-valenced creative novel metaphors (PosNM) vs. neutral novel
metaphors (NeutNM) at a threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected). Mean
mPFC signal (beta weights) for each condition is revealed in the bar chart
[adapted from Subramaniam et al. (2013)].
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significantly correlated with improved creative cognitive solving
abilities.
DOPAMINERGIC NEUROMODULATION PLAYS AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF POSITIVE
MOOD TO COGNITION
Some of the earliest investigators in this field proposed that the
cognitive effects of positive mood were likely to be mediated
by increased dopaminergic release in the brain (Ashby et al.,
1999, 2002). Ashby et al.’s (1999, 2002) predictions were informed
by research on the neurobiology of reward processing, which is
associated with increased positive mood and phasic release of
dopamine (Beninger, 1991; Bozarth, 1991; Phillips et al., 1992;
Schultz, 1992). They predicted that increased dopamine tone in
prefrontal cortex induced by a positive mood would enhance
access to a broad range of associations and facilitate switching
between attentional modes/strategies. Indeed, prior research sug-
gests that such increases of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex
up-regulate cognitive control mechanisms (Braver et al., 1999).
However, we must emphasize that the relationship between pos-
itive mood, reward processing, dopamine neuromodulation, and
cognitive control is likely to be highly non-linear and complex.
Studies from animals and humans reveal that the prediction and
receipt of rewards is associated with phasic activation of mid-
brain dopaminergic firing, while a positive mood is associated
with overall increased prefrontal dopamine release each with
distinct implications for cognition (Ashby et al., 2002; Schultz,
2002; Montgomery et al., 2007). As this field is still in its early
stages, we present here only a brief overview and a proposed
model for the role of dopaminergic modulation in the cog-
nitive effects of positive mood, in order to stimulate further
research.
First, while a positive mood facilitates creativity on tasks that
require divergent (broad) thinking, it is important to note that
Rowe et al. (2007) demonstrated that a positive mood may not
be beneficial for tasks requiring focused attention. This finding
raises the question of whether there is an optimal mood specific
to the demands of the task at hand. Specifically, Rowe et al. (2007)
used positive and sadmusic to induce positive and negative mood
states, relative to the neutral condition (which was induced by
participants reading facts about Canada); a mood manipulation
check demonstrated that the mood induction was successful.
Participants were then tested on the Eriksen flanker task in which
they had to selectively attend to the central letter while ignor-
ing distracting flanker stimuli. Rowe et al. (2007) found that
positive mood states increased participants’ visual scope of atten-
tion, making them more susceptible to the flanker distracters.
Participants who had greatest visuospatial breadth (increased sus-
ceptibility to the flanker distracters) also showed greatest breadth
in semantic scope of attention (indexed by the number of remote
associates accessed on the Remote Associates Task). Thus, while
a positive mood does broaden attention both in terms of inter-
nal conceptual semantic associations and external visual space, it
does not necessarily improve all aspects of cognitive performance.
Chermahini and Hommel (2012) investigated this question
more closely by examining the relationship between positive
mood, creativity, and dopamine on a creative divergent thinking
task. They found that performance on a divergent thinking task
was associated with spontaneous eye-blink rates (an indirect mea-
sure of an individual’s central dopamine tone), following an
inverted U-shape. The results suggest that greatest cognitive flex-
ibility is reached at an optimal level (“sweet spot”) of dopamine
release. They next used mood manipulation techniques in con-
junction with eye-blink rates (EBR) on this task to study the
influence of a positive mood on EBR and creative divergent
thinking. Mood was manipulated through mental recall in which
participants were asked to write down and recall positive and neg-
ative personal events in their life that made them happy or sad.
The mood manipulation check confirmed that participants were
more happy after the positive mood induction than before, and
were less happy after the negative mood induction than before.
EBRs were recorded right after the mood induction. Participants
then performed an Alternate Uses Task used to assess divergent
thinking. In this task, they were given a household item such as a
cup, and were asked to write down as many possible uses for it in
5min.
The investigators found that the positive mood induction
increased EBR and increased flexibility on the divergent think-
ing task compared to baseline. The more positive participants
became, the more flexible they were on the divergent thinking
task and the more their EBRs increased. These results indicate that
the changes in EBR (indexing central dopamine levels) induced
by a positive mood were related to the increases in flexibility.
This relationship was not found for the negative mood condi-
tion. Interestingly, upon closer inspection, when the investigators
conducted a median split of EBR at baseline, they found that
the induction of a positive mood improved flexibility in the low-
EBR group only. These data indicate that the relationship between
positive mood, dopamine tone, and creative problem-solving is
non-linear, and suggest that positive mood induction methods
might have the most cognitive impact on individuals who have
low basal dopamine tone.
To extend upon Chermahini and Hommel’s (2012) study, we
propose a working model (see Figure 5), in which positive mood
induction methods would have the greatest cognitive benefit on
tasks which require a broad scope of attention and particularly
for individuals with low-medium basal positive mood levels (and
also, theoretically, lower prefrontal dopamine tone), moving these
individuals toward an optimal level of cognitive flexibility. In
individuals with high basal positive mood levels, the cognitive
benefit will be smaller. In light of the evidence so far, we ten-
tatively propose that positive mood inductions associated with
increased dopamine release in the prefrontal cortex will help the
lower-mood individuals achieve improved cognitive control oper-
ations related to task-switching and response selection (Cohen
and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Cohen et al., 1996), which are essen-
tial components of creativity. These beneficial cognitive effects
will be maximized on tasks that require a broader scope of
attention (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Rowe et al., 2007).
By contrast, positive mood inductions in individuals with
abnormally high states of elevated mood, such as occurs dur-
ing a manic episode, would be contraindicated, as this would
contribute to further impairment in already impaired cognitive
control processes (Figure 5). Individuals suffering from mania
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FIGURE 5 | Model of the neural system interactions mediating the effect
of positive mood on creative cognition. The model predicts that the
largest gains in cognitive flexibility (indicated by the delta triangle) induced by
positive mood inductions will be observed for subjects with low-medium
basal positive mood levels, while individuals with mania will have impaired
creative flexibility.
are known to show weakened prefrontal control (Morice, 1990;
Johnson, 2005), and it is theorized that hyperdopaminergic tone
in prefrontal cortex during mania is associated with disinhibi-
tion in fronto-striatal efferents, contributing to a “noisy signal”
that impairs the selection of task-relevant information (Swerdlow
and Koob, 1987; Diehl and Gershon, 1992). Noisy signal from
fronto-striatal efferents into the mesolimbic pathway contributes
to reward-prediction errors, such that manic individuals have dif-
ficulty distinguishing behaviorally salient and adaptive rewarding
stimuli from less salient stimuli (Abler et al., 2008). Consequently,
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mania is associated with an overly broad scope of attention,
“hyper-salience,” distractibility, flight of ideas, and impaired
decision-making (Clark et al., 2002)—suggesting again that there
is a U-shaped curve—“too much” dopamine tone in prefrontal
regions can be as deleterious to adaptive creative problem-solving
as too little (Murphy et al., 1999, 2001). In this light, it is inter-
esting that mania—at least in its early phases of hypomania—is
characterized by broad and creative semantic associations and
thought processes, as well as high creative output, suggesting that
there may be an optimal level of prefrontal dopamine release
required for maximal creative performance (Schuldberg, 1990;
Jamison, 1993; Kaufmann, 2003) (Figure 5).
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE
POSITIVE MOOD AND ENHANCE COGNITION
A number of behavioral interventions have been developed from
the “positive psychology” model, and include: practicing opti-
mistic thinking, increasing attention and memory of positive
stimuli and experiences, practicing mindfulness and acceptance,
and increasing socializing behaviors. Sin and Lyubomirsky (2009)
conducted a meta-analysis of 49 positive psychology interven-
tions, and found that they were highly effective in enhancing
positive mood and overall well-being, with a medium effect
size of.29. Additionally, such positive psychology interventions
enhance mood and well-being not only in healthy participants,
but also in a range of patient populations, including those suffer-
ing from depression, anxiety, schizophrenia and HIV (Fava et al.,
2005; Seligman et al., 2006; Moskowitz et al., 2012; Meyer et al.,
2012; Caponigro et al., 2013). While the cognitive and underly-
ing neural effects of these interventions are not yet known, this
represents a fruitful area of future investigation.
In the past few years, a novel approach to positive mood inter-
ventions has emerged which allows for participants to volitionally
up-regulate positive mood states via neurofeedback techniques
such as real-time fMRI. Participants can be trained to voluntarily
control neural fMRI signal from target regions implicated in pos-
itive emotional processes (Johnston et al., 2010, 2011). Though
it has not yet been studied, positive mood up-regulation using
neurofeedback is likely to modulate cognition, particularly cre-
ative cognition. Based on our prior findings (Subramaniam et al.,
2009), we would predict that participants who are trained to
up-regulate signal within mPFC and bilateral lateral prefrontal
cortices will show enhanced positive mood preparatory brain
states. These enhanced positive mood preparatory brain states are
likely to facilitate attention/cognitive control processes on creative
tasks.
It is possible that real-time fMRI neurofeedback techniques
could be used to enhance positive mood and cognition not only
in healthy individuals, but also in individuals with depression and
schizophrenia who are characterized as having both reduced sen-
sitivity for maintaining positive affect and experiences inmemory
as well as heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli (Sloan et al.,
1997; Kan et al., 2004; Gard et al., 2011; Holt et al., 2011;
Ursu et al., 2011). Interestingly, in patients with depression and
schizophrenia, impaired attention, memory, self-regulation and
cognitive control associated with reduced cingulate/prefrontal
activation, has shown to be reversed with stimulation or enhanced
activation in these regions (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; Mayberg
et al., 2005; Haut et al., 2010; Subramaniam et al., 2012b). Thus,
it is possible that real-time fMRI neurofeedback targeting the
anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex may enhance
positive mood-cognition interactions in such patient groups.
SEVERAL CAVEATS
While we have argued in this review that positive mood exerts
some specific effects on neural activation states, in turn influ-
encing cognitive processes, it is important to stop and consider
whether other possible mechanisms might explain the effects of
positive mood on cognition. For example, could the cognitive-
enhancing influence of a positive mood be simply due to the
non-specific effects of physiologic arousal? To test this, Isen et al.
(1987) performed a study that included participants engaging in
exercise (to generate arousal with no affective tone), along with
a positive mood group, a neutral mood group, and a negative
mood group. This study found that participants in the exer-
cise condition did not demonstrate more solutions on classical
insight problems, such as Duncker’s candle task, compared to
the neutral or negative mood condition; in contrast, the posi-
tive mood group produced more solutions than any of the other
groups. These findings suggest that the influence of positive mood
on cognitive control/flexibility is not simply due to physiologic
arousal.
Other investigators have proposed that a positive mood facil-
itates a more heuristic, superficial mode of processing. For
instance, positive mood participants have been suggested to use
“satisfising” and superficial, rather than optimizing solving strate-
gies (Kaufmann and Vosburg, 1997). Estrada et al. (1997) found
evidence to the contrary while observing physicians in a pos-
itive mood state decide on a diagnosis for a rare case of liver
disease. Physicians in this study showed no evidence of super-
ficial processing, defined as deciding on a diagnosis without
having enough evidence. Furthermore, we have argued previ-
ously that superficial processing induced by a positive mood
would lead to more premature and incorrect responses; yet, high
and low positive-mood participants made equally few errors on
our creative problem-solving task (Subramaniam et al., 2009).
Therefore, it appears that the nature of the task is impor-
tant, and that one cannot make generalized conclusions about
mood-cognition interactions without taking the specific task
and event/contrast of interest into account. It is possible, for
example, that positive mood participants may engage in more
superficial processing on certain tasks compared to neutral
mood participants simply because they find the task boring or
incompatible with their mood state. Finally, some researchers
have proposed that a positive mood reduces overall cognitive
capacity (Mackie and Worth, 1989). For instance, a positive
mood may increase the load on working memory because it
increases the occurrence of positive mood-related thoughts that
are more likely to interrupt cognitive processing (Seibert and
Ellis, 1991). The evidence for this assertion does not appear
to be strong, however; and again, it is likely that the demands
of the task (selective focused attention vs. broad task-switching
or interference resolution) play an important role in determin-
ing the ultimate cognitive outcomes of a positive mood state.
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Another caveat in terms of the existing literature is the chicken-
and-egg question of which mechanisms are primary and which
are secondary. Does adopting a positive mood state induce
increased dopaminergic tone in prefrontal regions and enhance
access to distant semantic associations? Or do individuals with
broader and more rapidly accessible semantic association net-
works tend to exhibit positive mood states? Or are both of these
phenomena— a certain joie de vivre plus rapidly spreading access
in semantic networks—the manifestation of some other primary
underlying neural signature (e.g., dopaminergic tone in striatal
and prefrontal neural systems)? Only carefully designed mood-
induction studies, as well as probes into mood, reward respon-
sivity, and creative problem-solving across different behavioral
phenotypes, can answer these questions.
We also need to add a word of caution about potential
clinical applications. It may very well be the case that induc-
ing a positive mood with the goal of enhancing more far-
ranging semantic associations could be deleterious in the case
of people predisposed to mania or to schizophrenia. In the
former, one might precipitate an actual manic episode (as
can happen when such people are treated with antidepres-
sants). In the latter, one might worsen symptoms of thought
disorder, since some forms of schizophrenia are in fact char-
acterized by the presence of too many broad and maladap-
tive associations. Sometimes, too much “creativity” can be
deleterious.
It is highly likely that people can learn—through a vari-
ety of methods—to increase their positive mood volitionally,
using a range of straightforward behavioral techniques, and also
through real-time fMRI neurofeedback. The question will be: For
whom are these approaches most beneficial? And how should
they be combined with other approaches in order to maxi-
mize healthy functioning and well-being? Enhancing broader
semantic associations and greater cognitive flexibility may be
very useful for a person with cocaine addiction who is in
an active treatment program learning new critical psychoso-
cial skills, but may be very maladaptive for the same individ-
ual when they are in their “using” environment. A depressed
individual with low motivation and many perseverative rumi-
nations about past failures may benefit greatly from mood
enhancement that broadens their scope of attention and facil-
itates examining alternative interpretations through cognitive
behavioral therapy. But absent such psychological treatment, the
same broadening of attention may lead the depressed individ-
ual to contemplate various methods of self-harm/suicide as a
viable alternative.
SOME HAPPY THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
We have entered a new era in our understanding of how to opti-
mize learning in educational environments, and interestingly, it
is an era that recognizes the importance of developing creative
problem-solving capacities, rather than simply drilling the rote
memorization of facts and figures. We now understand that crit-
ical learning occurs best in social contexts, under conditions
of high intrinsic motivation, and is facilitated by appropriate
rewards—all conditions that generate and sustain positive mood
states. In the coming years, we can look forward to an even more
knowledgeable and nuanced grasp of how to use these positive
moods to help learners develop their skills as innovative and
creative problem-solvers.
Similarly, there is a sea change in our approach to facilitating
health and well-being in individuals with psychiatric illness. In the
past decade, the field of mental health treatment has embraced a
model of autonomy, dignity, and recovery for people with psychi-
atric illness; this has generated a growing emphasis on preventive
interventions, on the techniques of positive psychology, and on
developing therapies that go beyond the palliation of symptoms
and that instead generate optimal well-being and community
functioning. With a new focus on the important role that expec-
tation and motivation play in the recovery process, and with a
greater understanding of the many behavioral elements that can
induce positive changes in mood state, we can expect to become
even more refined in our ability to create mood-enhancing inter-
ventions to help individuals engage in adaptive problem-solving
and creative skill-learning and coping.
Finally, the nascent but rapidly growing area of computer-
ized cognitive training for psychiatric illnesses is moving in the
direction of “gamification”—adapting the techniques of game
developers and interactive software experts to make the cognitive
training as engaging, fun, and rewarding as possible (Vinogradov
et al., 2012). Such a treatment approach, if it reaches its full
potential, will be able to harness the mood-elevating aspects of
well-designed games and of social networking to promote the
highest possible degree of cognitive enhancement and learning.
The ultimate aim will be to help all individuals maximize their
“happiness” and “creative problem-solving” potential, so they
can—to paraphrase Lincoln—make up their minds to be as happy
and successful as possible.
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